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We assess the impact of numerical fiscal rules on budget balances and sovereign 
yields, as well as the impact of expenditure rules on primary expenditure. The panel data 
covers 28 EU countries for the period of 1990-2018. The results show that numerical 
fiscal rules improve government performance leading to a reduction of budget deficits 
and lowers sovereign bond yields. Distinctively, expenditure rules hold a significant 
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THE IMPACT OF FISCAL RULES ON GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 
AND BORROWING COSTS 
 




  The build-up of budget deficits among some European Union (EU) countries has 
risen well above the Maastricht Treaty1 criteria implemented in 1992, for countries to be 
able to enter the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
 Numerous empirical studies have shown the efficiency of fiscal rules in 
preventing the build-up of public debt and imposing fiscal discipline on governments. As 
reported by Afonso and Jalles (2019) the impact of fiscal rules in the bond yield is 
negatively correlated, which implies lower government borrowing costs especially for 
advanced economies. 
 Fiscal rules have also a relevant impact on debtors' credibility, where the financial 
crisis of 2009 lead to a credibility crisis concerning the sustainability of public debt which 
led to a transformation in the market for government bonds within the Euro Area. An 
increase in Creditor´s awareness of the defaulting risk regarding sovereign bonds lead to 
an increase in the financing cost of several Euro member countries. This fundamental 
change in risk sensibility multiplied the interest rate but was also associated with a 
deteriorating fiscal position (Heinemann et al., 2013). 
 Fostering a better fiscal reputation is an important step to prevent the increase in 
borrowing costs, currently, policymakers try to do so with the implementation of better 
European and national rules. In particular, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) play a 
 
1 The debt-to-GDP ratio should not be over 60% and a budget deficit limited to 3% of GDP. 
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fundamental role to reinforce the fulfillment of the Maastricht Treaty criteria by applying 
sanctions to the member countries that exceed those limits. 
 Furthermore, in 2012 the European Heads of State signed the Six Pack and Fiscal 
Compact in order to foster fiscal sustainability. All the participating countries had to 
introduce national fiscal rules such as a maximum limit of annual structural deficits of 
5% of GDP. The expectation is that independently of current budgetary performances, 
such fiscal rules send out credible signals and cut short the way towards lowering the risk 
on spreads.  
This study aims to assess the importance of numerical fiscal rules regarding the 
improvement of budget balances, but also shows the link between fiscal rules and 
government borrowing costs by analyzing the impact of fiscal rules in government yields. 
Moreover, we compute an Expenditure rule index to evaluate the impact of this specific 
group or rule in primary expenditure.  
This analysis is based on a dataset elaborated by the European Commission 
containing all types of numerical fiscal rules for the 28 Member States from 1990 to 2018. 
Also for further analysis of the relevance of fiscal rules we compute an Expenditure rule 
index based on the same dataset. 
This paper is organized in the following order: Section 2 provides a literature 
review, Section 3 an empirical analysis which is composed of the sub-sections 









2.1Government borrowing costs in the EU 
 
The main cost of issuing debt is associated with the default risk premia, within the 
context of a monetary union, it appears to be consistent that several economic variables 
and also non-economical play a central role in how the markets behave based on the 
global macroeconomics conditions. 
 According to Alesina et al., (1992), the existence of default premia increases in a 
nonlinear way, with higher debt levels and with the growth rate of debt. Using data from 
OECD,  it is also observed that the differential between public and private bond yields is 
positively related to the level of public debt. 
 It is was also shown by Bernoth et al.,  (2004) that the differential between bonds 
issued by EU countries, Germany or the USA contains risk premia that increases with 
debt, deficits, and debt-services ratio and also depends on the issuer’s relative bond 
market size. The study consists of data of spreads between the Deutsche mark (Euro after 
1999) and US dollar-denominated bonds issues of 12 EU governments, Germany and the 
US government. 
 The authors also use data from before and after the implementation of the EMU 
to obtain direct estimates about the effect of the monetary union on risk premia paid by 
the European governments. The positive relation between the default risk premia and the 
debt as well debt-services ratio is consistent with the view that credit markets monitor 
fiscal performance, exerting disciplinary pressure on governments. 
 It is noticeable that countries that hold a larger share in the total EU debt will pay 
lower interest rates compared to those countries that hold smaller shares. Nevertheless, 
liquidity risk premia drops with EMU membership, which points to an enhancement of 
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financial market integration. Members of a monetary union will enjoy lower risk premia 
but this benefit declines with the rise of public debt compared to Germany. This outcome 
is mainly driven by the assumption that markets anticipate fiscal support from the EMU 
countries in financial distress unless these had been much undisciplined before.  
 At the onset of the financial crisis the assumption that EU members are credible 
debtors, reflected in low long-term interest rates and low spreads compared to German 
bonds. This latter came under fire, resulting in increased attention to fiscal developments 
and related impact on government borrowing costs. By employing dynamic panel data 
and using de Arellano-bond estimator, allowed for consistent estimates of the study 
parameters. Bobetko et al.,(2013) This study covering 17 European countries, of which 9 
were developed and 8 were emerging markets, confirms the belief that a worsening of 
current and expected budget balances, as well as increases in public debt leads to growth 
in the short and long term interest rates for sovereign debtors.  
 According to the authors, the main spreads determinators recognized in the 
literature are credit risk, international risk aversion, and liquidity risk. These findings 
imply that spreads had a stronger response to changes in the overall market risk after the 
beginning of the crisis, also credit risk indicators increased significantly as a determinator 
of spreads during the mentioned period.  
For the period 2004-2011, the fiscal balances and public debt projections had a 
significant impact on the differential in government bond yields for countries with 
emerging markets. On the other hand, in developed countries, sovereign spread dynamics 
were mostly driven by the global market sentiments. 
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The results above confirm that markets appreciate both savings and growth. 
However, if the expected growth rises or the projections of fiscal policy becomes more 
prudent the markets should demand lower spreads.  
  The main focus has been on fiscal variables, and recent studies have stated that 
not only fiscal variables, but also political factors have a significant impact on credit risk 
and consequently borrowing costs. According to Zilinsky, (2009) creditors care about 
both economic and non-economic variables, and investors recalibrate or update the 
importance of the country's characteristics, for example, its credit rating and democratic 
capital. 
As reported by Zilinsky public debt and a range of other economic variables had 
a relatively weak correlation with spreads in the EU during an expansionary period, on 
the other hand, it was observed that democratic capital was a robust predictor of spreads 
between 2003 and 2007, but completely lost its relevance within a financial distress 
situation mainly after 2008 with the inception of the financial crises.  
The main point, is that investors do not always behave the same way, adapting  
according to the local and global conditions as expected. The conclusion is that although 
democratic capital lost its relevance in 2008, countries which had longer democratic 
traditions in the EU, compared to the new member enjoyed a reputational advantage.  
Thus, institutional characteristics may sometimes (depending on the global 
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2.2 The effect of fiscal rules 
 
  There has been clear evidence that European Union countries have increased their 
reliance on numerical fiscal rules, in which the Maastricht treaty and the SGP seem to 
have been a catalyst for its introduction. (Dahan et al.,  2010; Ayuso-i-Casals et al., 2012). 
Particularly, ( Debrun et al., 2008; X. Debrun, 2000) conducted studies to assess the 
importance of numerical fiscal rules in the enhance the fiscal stance . 
 In general, it is supported by the literature the assumption that fiscal rules enrich 
public finance and also numerical expenditure rules can improve budgetary discipline 
(Afonso & Guimarães, 2015; Sebastian Hauptmeier et al.,2010; Holm-hadulla et 
al.,2010). 
 Numerical fiscal rules may fulfill different objectives, with the main focus being 
fostering fiscal sustainability. Kumar et al., (2009) provides the following definitions: 
 - Budget balance rules, which are specified as the overall balance, helps to ensure 
that the debt-to-GDP ratio is an appropriate criteria for fiscal solvency since it can insure 
that the intertemporal budget constrain of the government is met.  Primary balance rules 
are less related to debt sustainability, since an increase in interest payments would not 
require an adjustment, even if they affect the budget and public debt. 
 - Debt rules set an explicit limit or target for public debt in percentage of GDP. 
By definition these types of rules are the most effective in terms of ensuring convergence 
to the debt target, unfortunately, do not provide sufficient guidance for fiscal policy when 
the debt level is below its threshold. 
 - Expenditure rules generally set limits on total, primary, or current spending in 
absolute terms, growth rate, or in the percentage of GDP, as such, these types of rules are 
not directly correlated to debt sustainability, considering they do not constrain the revenue 
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side. Nevertheless, they provide an operational tool to trigger the required fiscal 
consolidation when they are supplemented by debt or budgetary rules. 
 - Revenue rules set upper and lower limits on revenues and are aimed to promote 
revenue collection that can prevent an excessive tax burden. These rules similarly to 
expenditure rules are also not directly linked to the control of public debt  as they do not 
constrain spending.  
  As specified by Ayuso-i-Casals et al., (2012), it is possible to observe a  linkage 
between numerical rules and fiscal outcomes. The main goal of the study was to provide 
a comprehensive overview of the fiscal rules enforced in 25 EU countries and to analyze 
the determinants and the respective impact on the budgetary outcome. In this study it is 
perceived that when numerical fiscal rules cover bigger shares of government finances, 
ceteris paribus, lower deficits were observed, but also that the characteristics of fiscal 
rules hold explanatory power on the budgetary outcomes. Particularly, the existence of a 
strong reinforcement mechanism appears to be an important feature in maximizing the 
effect of fiscal rules.  
 Several empirical  studies  support the use of fiscal rules to enhance fiscal 
developments, for instance, Debrun, (2000) highlights that a suitable institutional 
designed fiscal policy is crucial for the success of EMU, since new supranational 
policymakers would not automatically enjoy the benefits of well-established stability-
oriented reputation. 
 It has been shown that the mission of the EU fiscal framework and also country-
specific institutional features play an important role in inducing the introduction of fiscal 
rules, based on Debrun et al., (2008), it is also noticeable a strong link between numerical 
fiscal rules and fiscal performance, as well as the hypothesis that fiscal rules are only 
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introduced at times of recession and/or when fiscal stress is not supported. Also, the type 
and design of fiscal rules appear to matter for their effectiveness. According to the author 
rules that mainly target the budget balance or the general government debt have a 
significant and consistent impact on deficits, on the other hand, expenditure rules alone 
do not produce a significant impact on the budgetary balance. It is also suggested that in 
countries where rules are designed with the main goal of reducing or avoid deficits by 
using the stabilization function of fiscal policy, on average shows less pro-cyclical 
policies.   
 For Wierts, (2008), expenditures policies do not have a systematical reaction to 
short-term revenues shocks, which commonly have a cyclical nature. However, it is 
shown that extra or shortfall on revenues leads to a procyclical policy reaction in 
expenditure. Nonetheless, over the years it has been often argued that a well-designed 
medium-term expenditure rule may counter the procyclical response on the expenditure 
side of the budget.  
 More recently, in a study by (Afonso & Jalles, 2019) covering both advanced and 
emerging economies between 1980-2016, which assesses the effect of fiscal rules on 
sovereign bond spreads, they concluded that  fiscal rules have a robust negative and 
statistically significant  effect on sovereign bonds. In addition, the more fiscally 
responsible countries are the ones that have more success in reducing government 
borrowing costs through fiscal rules implementation. Besides the fact that fiscal rules are 
an ally in times of recession, they also signal the financial markets, leading them to reduce 
the risk premium in government's bonds. Also, when it comes to the design fiscal rules, 
independent monitoring of compliance, done outside the government also leads to a 
reduction of sovereign spreads.  








For the empirical analysis, a fiscal reaction function is estimated following the 
common approach in the literature. Having said that, the fiscal reaction function aims to 
assess the impact of fiscal rules on the primary balance (Debrun et al.,, 2008) and takes 




The variables are determined  as capbit, defined by the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance in country i for period t, bi  represented as the individual effect of each country i, 
debtit-1 is the debt-to-GDP in the country i in period t-1, the outputgapit-1 is the lagged 
output gap in country i in period t-1, friit represents the fiscal rule index for country i in 
period t and finally  xit  represents the variables that might hold additional explanatory 
power in the model focusing specific events (eg. EMU run-up, introduction SGL). The 
above mentioned variables are further detailed in the next section.  
After computing the results it is expected that f>0, meaning that more and better 
fiscal rules (better FRI) influence positively the CAPB, leading to a better and healthier 
fiscal position. We also assess the effectiveness of expenditure rules, by computing an 
expenditure rule index calculated using EC Fiscal Rule Dataset and by regressing those 
results using  primary expenditure as a dependent variable. 
 In addition, it is important to verify if the induction of fiscal rules will improve 
governments “savings”, one of the more direct ways to evaluate it is by checking the 
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 stands for the 10-year maturity bond yield,  is a vector consisting of , 
DEBT, CA, REER, IP, GDPgr, and CIP, for period t, and country i. vixit is the measure 
of investors’ willingness to take risk. Iit represents the short-term interest rate for each 





 The data was collected for 28 EU countries between 1990-2018  namely: Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United 
Kingdom. 
 The macroeconomic variables included in this study were extracted from the 
AMECO database, including the following : CAPB, Debt-to-GDP ratio (debt), Primary 
expenditure (pe), Output gap measured as the gap between actual and potential gross 
domestic product (outputgap), 10-year sovereign bond yield (yield), short-term interest 
rate (I), current account balance (CA), consumer price index (CPI), real effective 
exchange rate (REER), industrial production (IP) and finally, GDP growth rate (GDPgr), 
as mentioned above. The measurement of international risk aversion is taken from the 
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Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX) computed yearly, from 
Yahoo! Finance.  
In addition, to evaluate the impact of particular events into the dependent variable, 
we included a set of 3 dummy variables in the regression: 
- EMU: intends to take into account the run-up to the EMU, taking the value 1 
for the EU-15 countries and years between 1994 and 1998 ( Debrun et al., 2008; 
Ayuso-i-Casals et al., 2012) 
- SGP represents the introduction of the SGP and assumes the value 1 for Euro-
area countries and years after 1998. ( Debrun et al., 2008; Ayuso-i-Casals et al., 
2012) 
- Enlargement: assumes the value 1 for the 10 countries that enter the EU in 2004 
and after. ( Debrun et al., 2008; Ayuso-i-Casals et al., 2012) 
Regarding EC’s fiscal rule index (FRI), the same is constructed based on 
information collected directly from the Members States. The dataset covers all types of 
numerical fiscal rules: budget balance, debt, expenditure, and revenue rules; and all levels 
of government: central, regional and local, general government, and social security. The 
survey reports information divided into five criteria: the statutory base of the rule, the 
room for revising objectives, mechanisms for monitoring compliance and enforcement 
of the rule, the existence of predefined enforcement mechanisms, and the media visibility 
of the rule. This index covers the period of 1990-2018.  
Taking a further evaluation into the EC’s fiscal rule index we can observe that rules 
have become increasingly more relevant, from only 13 rules in 1990 to 112 in 2018. The 
majority of rules have been budget balance rules, both debt and expenditure rules have 
increased considerably especially in the last 4 years of the covered period.  




Regarding the type of government, most rules were applied to the general 
government and local government. Both local and central government's main target are 
budget balance rules. Expenditure rules have a wider representation in the General 




Currently, almost all EU countries have implemented fiscal rules, and the countries 
with higher number of rules implemented are Bulgaria, Italy, and Portugal. On the other 
hand, Cyprus, Czech Republic, and Greece have lower a number of rules in force. The 






The baseline results suggest that the EC’s FRI is generally significant with a 
positive coefficient, meaning that if the FRI increases by one unit, then the Cyclically 
adjusted primary balance (CAPB) can increase up to 0,41 percentage points (p.p.), as  
observed in column (1), Table 2. For this regression, we also omitted the control variable 








In column (2) as the control variables were introduced, we can observe that fiscal 
rules are still statistically significant. The simple OLS regression showed that the control 
variables are not statistically significant as the run-up to the EMU, the introduction of 10 
new member states (enlargement) and SGP have all positive coefficients. This means that 
during the year of implementation of the EMU in the EU-15 countries, an increase of  
0,0360 p.p. on the CAPB was noticeable, also the integration of 10 new members after 
2004 lead to an increase of 0,288 p.p on the CAPB, and for countries that have been part 
of the European Union since 1998 (SGP) a positive impact on CAPB of 0,163 p.p was 
reflected. As mentioned before the control variables are not statistically significant. 
In column (3), Table 2, the Random Effects model results are essentially the same 
with also a statistically significant FRI. The difference resides in the fact that, the control 
variable SGP is statistical significant at 1%, but with a negative coefficient. The 
interpretation is that during the introduction of SGP in 1998 the EU countries had a 
negative impact on CAPB. The result might be driven by the asymmetry of the use of 
fiscal policy over the cycle, meaning thar if the deficits are not substantially reduced 
during the periods when countries have “economic freedom” when they set strict limits2  
there is no room for the automatic stabilizers fully work without breaching the limits that 
the SGP sets. 
For the Tow Stage Least Squares regression, presented in column (4), with the 
instrument of FRI being its own lag, we conclude that FRI is still statistically significant 
with a coefficient of 0,421 p.p.,  and with the coefficient for  P-value of the Wu-Hausman 
 
2  The introduction of the SGP lead to limit on the deficit of 3% of GDP. 
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test pointing to no endogeneity problems. However, we still had concerns of reverse 
causality between the fiscal stance and the FRI, and to access those concerns we 
computed the Granger Causality Test. The P-values obtained from the causality test are 
inconclusive, meaning that we cannot assume if the causality  runs from the 
implementation of fiscal rules that leads to better balances, or whether it is better fiscal 
outcomes that lead to the implementation of more rules.  
We repeat the same regression in Table 3, but this time the dependent variable is 
the primary expenditure - since interest payments are hardly controlled by governments, 
so expenditure rules are more effective concerning expenditures alone. To do so, we also 
compute an expenditure rule index based on EC’s data set, using the fiscal rule strength 
and the government coverage for expenditure rules provided by the data set and compute 




It's performed once more an OLS regression and as well an IV regression to assess 
the impact of expenditure rules on primary expenditure, for the same reason stated above 
(check biasness and robustness), we started by computing a regression omitting the 
control variables column (1), Table 3, and observed that the ERI has a significant impact 
on Primary expenditures which translates as if ERI increases by one unit the Primary 
expenditures decreases up to 0,886 p.p. 
 
3 The ERI is calculated taking into account the European Commission criteria, using the fiscal rule 
strength already provided by the data set. The expenditures rule index is obtained as follows. Fist we start 
by multiplying the already provided fiscal rules strength by the coverage of general government finances 
for only expenditure rules, Next the product obtain are summed up, per countries for each year.   
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Once the control variables are added the expenditure rule index is still statistically 
significant but with a lower coefficient (-0,466 p.p.). For the control variables only the 
Run-up to the EMU by EU-15 is statistically significant with a positive coefficient, the 
explanation is that the Run-up to the EMU leads to an increase of 6,502 p.p. in primary 
expenditure. We also can observe that the introduction of the 10 new EU members in 
2004 lead to a decrease in the primary expenditure of 2,027 p.p., but the results are not 
statistically significant. Also in the random effect regression column (3), Table 3, we can 
observe that countries that have been part of the EU since 1998 affect negatively the 
Primary Expenditure with a coefficient of -4,377 p.p. and with a statistical significance 
of 10%. 
 For the IV regression the results are consistently the same, the instrument of ERI 
is its own lag, and once more the P-value for the endogeneity test is not statistically 
significant, meaning that ERI is not endogenous. Besides this, according to the Granger 
Causality Test we cannot conclude that the causality runs from the rules implementation 
or from better fiscal outcomes.  The results remain robust when ERI instruments are used, 
confirming that the results are not biased due to of reverse causality.  
 
To highlight the importance of fiscal rules, we perform once more an empirical 
study that aims to assess the impact of fiscal rules on government 10-years bond yield. 
The FRI was statistically significant in all regressions  meaning that if the FRI increases 
by one unit the yields decrease  by 0,453 p.p. column (1), Table 4. In column (2), Table 
4 we performed a fixes effect regression and the results were essentially the same. Once 
we computed the IV regression the FRI was still statistical significant leading to a 
decrease of 0,540p.p. in the 10-years bond yield if FRI improves by 1 unit, and the P-
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value of the Wu-Hausman test indicated that we had no endogeneity problems. The 
causality test is not conclusive, so we cannot be sure if it runs from FRI to yield.  
[Table 4] 
In addition, the variables that represent a better economic environment – GDPgr 
and IP- as expected, lead to lower values of sovereign bond yield. Regarding the 
Exchange market volatility index, we can observe that investors are becoming more risk-
averse- vix increasing- in all regressions the vix was statistically significant meaning that 
if the vix increases by one unit the yields can reduce up to 0,0385 p.p.. This can be 
corroborated by fact that such rules are associated with  government commitment to reach 
a particular  goal, and translates into a higher degree of certain regarding fiscal outcomes, 
compared to a no rule scenario.  
All together, we can observe that FRI has a strong explanatory power over budget 
balances, and that the variables that capture developments in the EU and EMU (EMU, 
Enlargement, and SPG) hold some explanatory power. If we only take into account  
expenditure rules, we also observe a positive impact on primary expenditure ratios. 
Additionally, countries in which these rules are applied to discretionary public 
expenditure, benefit from better expenditure ratios.  
Furthermore, fiscal rules have an important impact on 10-Years government bond 
yield regarding capital market sentiments, and so we can conclude that fiscal markets 
value rules and countries experience lower yields.  
  





The main goal of this study was to assess if countries that have fiscal rules in force 
experience better fiscal outcomes such as better budget balances that consequently 
translate into better Debt ratios. It is suggested by the literature that in fact exists a 
correlation between fiscal rules and fiscal balances. From the empirical study presented 
above, we can conclude that fiscal rules lead to better CAPB, unfortunately, we can’t 
guarantee that the causality runs from FRI to CAPB.  
Also, we cheeked if rules that target public expenditure contribute to their control 
and the consolidation of government outcomes (better fiscal balances). The computed 
regressions showed that the ERI has a significant explanatory power for developments in 
primary expenditure, and so enforcing the importance of expenditure rules.  
With regards to the perspective of capital markets, we regressed the FRI into 10-
years bond yield, concluding that the implementation of rules lead to lower yields, 
however, we can’t conclude that the causality runs from FRI to yields. The impact of vix 
on the government bond yields is negative meaning that financial markets are becoming 
more risk-averse, leading to improvement on  sovereign yields.  
Essentially we can confirm that FRI has a significant impact in countries 
performance  and also leads to lower government borrowing costs (smaller yields). 
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Table 1: Total Numeric Fiscal Rules By Type of Government and aggregated  Target 
(1990-2018) 
 GG LG RG CG SS Multiple Total 
BBR 55 25 7 10 9 8 114 
DR 29 17 4 5 0 1 56 
ER 25 2 4 8 2 12 53 
RR 2 0 0 6 1 3 12 
ER/BBR 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 
Total 111 44 15 29 12 28 239 
Note: BBR- Budget balance Rules; DR- Debt Rules; ER- Expenditure Rules; RR- Revenue Rules; 
GG- General Government; LG- Local Government; RG- Regional Government; CG- Central 
Government and SS- Social Security. 
Source: Numerical Fiscal Rules Dataset, European Commission 
 
 
Figure 1: Numerical fiscal rules by type of aggregate targeted since 1990 
 
1990 1995 2000 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
 
Note: BBR – Balance Budget Rule; DR – Debt Rule; ER – Expenditure Rule; RR – 
Revenue Rule; Source: Numerical Fiscal Rule Database, European Commission. 
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Table 2 : Baseline results: The impact of fiscal rules on Government fiscal performance 
Dependent variable                              
  Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 
DEBT 0.0297*** 0.0300*** 0.0692*** 0.0301*** 
 (0.00364) (0.00420) (0.00725) (0.00415) 
     
FRI 0.410*** 0.411*** 0.484*** 0.421*** 
 (0.121) (0.124) (0.104) (0.139) 
     
∆outputgap 0.0358 0.0250 -0.0397 0.0240 
 (0.0759) (0.0768) (0.0552) (0.0760) 
     
Enlargement  0.288 0.954 0.291 
  (0.513) (1.237) (0.506) 
     
EMU  0.0360 -0.414 0.0419 
  (0.529) (1.251) (0.524) 
     
SGP  0.163 -1.226* 0.164 
  (0.331) (0.712) (0.326) 
     
_cons -1.967*** -2.218*** -3.956*** -2.233*** 
 (0.320) (0.477) (1.040) (0.481) 
N 265 265 265 265 
R2 0.209 0.213  0.213 
adj. R2 0.200 0.195  0.195 
Hausman test 
 
NO NO YES NO 
Endogeneity test NO NO NO YES 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, the level of significance is reported as follows * p 
< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. the FRI is taken from the EC data set and the instrumental 
variables user in the 2SLS regression is the FRI own lag. 
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Table 3: The impact of Expenditure rules in Primary Expenditure 
Dependent Variable                                  
                                                                                     Primary Expenditure 
 (1) ( 2) (3) (4) 











 (0.0383) (0.0376) (0.0173) (0.203) 
     
outputgap -0.525** -0.139 -0.538*** -0.00705 
 (0.260) (0.231) (0.125) (0.316) 
     
ERI -0.886*** -0.466*** -0.360** -0.587*** 
 (0.162) (0.154) (0.155) (0.192) 
     
Enlargement - -2.027 -0.954 -2.333 
  (1.711) (4.077) (1.921) 
     
EMU - 6.502*** 6.519* 5.923*** 
  (1.373) (3.355) (1.623) 
     
SGP2 - 3.103 4.377*** 3.152 
  (2.960) (1.396) (2.984) 
     
_cons 47.57*** 38.56*** 36.50*** 39.30*** 
 (0.852) (3.309) (3.398) (3.463) 
N 94 94 94 79 
R2 0.316 0.543  0.539 
adj. R2 0.293 0.511  0.501 
Hausman NO NO YES NO 











Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses, the level of significance is reported as follows * p 
< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. the FRI is taken from the EC data set and the instrumental 
variables used in the 2SLS regression is the ERI own lag. 
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Table 4: The impact of FRI in 10-years bond yield 
Dependent variable 
                10-Years Bond Yield 
 (1) (2) (3) 









 (0.0110) (0.0102) (0.0129) 
    
FRI -0.453*** -0.453*** -0.540*** 
 (0.152) (0.150) (0.160) 
    
CIP -0.00972 -0.00803 -0.0129 
 (0.0149) (0.0142) (0.0162) 
    
REER -0.0293** -0.0268* -0.000938 
 (0.0142) (0.0146) (0.0128) 
    
IP -0.0476*** -0.0580*** -0.0169** 
 (0.00874) (0.00875) (0.00800) 
    
I 0.683*** 0.705*** 0.587*** 
 (0.0743) (0.0699) (0.0819) 
    
GDPgr -0.250*** -0.234*** -0.258*** 
 (0.0403) (0.0395) (0.0428) 
    
CA 0.0240 0.105*** -0.0773*** 
 (0.0316) (0.0339) (0.0250) 
    
vix -0.0385** -0.0304** -0.0485*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0151) (0.0188) 
    
_cons 12.39*** 12.70*** 7.158*** 
 (2.016) (2.008) (1.849) 
N 313 313 313 
R2  0.662 0.519 
adj. R2  0.635 0.504 
Hausman Test NO YES NO 
    
Endogeneity 
Test 
NO NO YES 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, the parameter, significance 
are reported as follows * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The instrumental 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics 




CAPB 0.443 0.443 2.325 2.325 2.325 265 
Debt-to-GDP DEBT 56.03 56.03 33.00 33.00 33.00 652 
EC’s FRI FRI -0.00 -0.00 1.000 1.000 1.000 812 
Consumer price 
index CIP 77.04 77.04 23.69 23.69 23.69 799 
Real Effective 
Exchange rate REER 101.5 101.5 11.46 11.46 11.46 432 
Industrial 
Production IP 92.17 92.17 22.99 22.99 22.99 715 
10-Year bond 
Yield yield 5.137 5.137 3.197 3.197 3.197 660 
Short-term 
Interest rate I 4.935 4.935 7.494 7.494 7.494 708 
Debt-to-GDP 




CA 1.003 -1.003 5.742 5.742 5.742 601 
Debt-to-GDP 
variation ∆Debt 2.580 2.580 12.39 12.39 12.39 678 
Output Gap outputgap -0.0896 -0.0896 3.126 3.126 3.126 714 
Dummy for the 
10 Countries 
entering the EU 
Enlargement 0.357 0.357 0.479 0.479 0.479 812 
Dummy for the 
run-up to EMU EMU 0.536 0.536 0.499 0.499 0.499 812 
Dummy for the 
introduction of 
SGP 
SGP2 0.724 0.724 0.447 0.447 0.447 812 
Primary 















vix 19.33 19.33 5.770 5.770 5.770 812 
 
 
